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Baring tHe Brain as WeLL as tHe souL: 
 MiLan Kundera’s The Joke
I
Milan Kundera’s first major novel, The Joke, was written in 1961–1965, before he made the decision to leave Czechoslovakia 
and take up residency as a political exile in France.1 With a few note-
worthy exceptions, critics of the work focused on its political message 
in a Cold War context. this was easy to do: its plot revolves around an 
avid young Czech communist (Ludvik), who writes an ironic postcard 
to his overly earnest girlfriend while she is away at a political training 
camp. the year is 1950, and among intellectuals, enthusiasm for a new 
era of soviet-mediated socialism is a genuine response to the chaotic 
disintegration of old certainties after the nazi occupation of the coun-
try. Ludvik is dedicated to the cause of communism, but he also wants 
to get laid. in response to his girlfriend’s ingenuous letters about the 
“healthy optimism” of camp life, he quips on a postcard, “optimism is the 
opium of the people! A healthy atmosphere stinks of stupidity! Long live Trotsky! 
Ludvik” (p. 34). 
the repercussions are swift and serious. Ludvik loses his Party member-
ship and is expelled from the university. as a non-student with a political 
strike on his record, he cannot defer military duty, and is assigned to 
a unit of blacklisted conscripts to two years of hard labor in the mines 
outside of ostrava (a provincial town in Moravia). Ludvik’s trauma is 
the trauma of countless participants in the cannibalistic logic of stalin-
ism: at first he believes in the Party and is genuinely dismayed to find 
his identity as a member of the vanguard group forcibly exchanged for 
a new identity as social outcast and “enemy of the people.” He quickly 
202 Philosophy and Literature
looses his former communist convictions, but this does not mitigate the 
sheer physical trauma of brutal army conditions and the irretrievable 
loss of youth. 
in this bleak breaking point of his life, Ludvik finds salvation in his 
sudden and all-consuming love for an ordinary local girl he coinciden-
tally encounters during one of his rare sunday afternoon leaves. in 
Kundera’s handling, the moment of falling in love is described as an 
instance of our implacable urge to ascribe meaning and intention to 
random events: “a great deal has been said about love at first sight; i 
am perfectly aware of love’s retrospective tendency to make a legend 
of itself, turn its beginnings into a myth; so i don’t want to assert that 
it was love; but i have no doubt there was some kind of clairvoyance at 
work” (p. 66). instead of a psychologically nuanced rendering of bud-
ding romance (as perhaps tolstoy would have given us), we get a dissec-
tion of the cognitive mechanism that irrationally attributes clairvoyance 
(the universe “knows” something) to the encounter with the object of 
infatuation. For her part, the girl Lucie seems happy for the friendship 
of this embittered conscript, but as soon as he tries to move their rela-
tionship past the kissing stage to actual coitus, she resists desperately. 
He assumes she is a virgin and that her resistance is a pointless combi-
nation of fear and modesty. in a moment of overwhelming frustration, 
he breaks off with her and she disappears from his life until a chance 
encounter fifteen years later. 
the three other characters that share Ludvik’s generational trauma 
are neither mute, nor mysterious in their attributions of meaning to 
the botched course of their lives. all of them initially supported the 
communist take-over of Czechoslovakia in 1948. all of them willingly 
participated in the construction of an ideological regime that soon 
revealed its intolerance of any doubt, ambiguity, alternative thinking, 
or creative opposition. in the name of creating an utopian state “for 
the workers by the workers,” the Czechoslovak Communists arrested or 
expelled from their jobs hundreds of so-called “bourgeois sympathizers” 
(intellectuals and entrepreneurs of various stripes); it staged spectacular 
show trials and executed its critics; and gradually, it leveled public dis-
course to a steady cant of conformist rhetoric and practice. When the 
lives of all four narrators intersect in 1965, each of them must look into 
a chasm that separates former illusions and crimes of conscience from 
the present-day exigencies of getting on with life in a new, less ideologi-
cal era. the basic problematic is at once utterly simple and ubiquitous, 
yet perennially unsolvable: after any trauma (personal or generational), 
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what can be forgotten, and what can be revenged or redressed? The Joke 
poses an ethical challenge to find and depict a space between the poles 
of historical amnesia (silence and forgetting) and collective vengeance 
(former victims reenact the violence of their oppressors, in reverse). 
in his non-fictional essays, Kundera has already suggested what kind 
of art is best equipped to show us the way towards a space that neither 
forgets trauma, nor reenacts it. in 1983, Kundera contributed an essay 
on the Czech composer Janacek to an émigré publication, Cross Currents: 
A Journal of Central european Culture.2 in the article, he is particularly 
interested in Janacek’s last opera, an adaptation of dostoevsky’s novel 
about life in a siberian prison camp. Kundera finds that “when invested 
with the modern hyper-sensitivity of his music, it [house of the Dead] 
becomes the image of today’s concentration camp” (CC, p. 377). the 
essay asks “How is it possible that Janacek’s final work, his musical last 
testament—he died the same year—was a vision of the hell of today? 
Why was he interested in a situation that had no perceptible link with 
his personal experiences? Was it from the night of the future that it had 
come to him?” (CC, p. 377). in other words, Kundera applauds Janacek’s 
proleptic vision—his music shows us the future that will inevitably be 
reenacted if we willfully forget the past. 
Janacek’s ability to “predict the future” is explained as a function of 
his disturbingly polyrhythmic and polyphonic style. Kundera’s analysis of 
Janacek’s difficult aesthetic structures vindicates the staging of multiple 
voices and perspectives in art (no matter how jarring to the reader’s/
listener’s sensibilities). When the voices of Janacek’s songs “intermingle, 
interlace and mesh in a fascinating polyrhythm,” the listener gets the 
“impression of hearing wild cries from the crowd, each person shouting 
his truth without listening to the other. this is neither homophony nor 
counterpoint. it is the inimitable polyphony of expressions” (CC, p. 376). We 
can assume, in consonance with the above analysis of Janacek’s music, 
that Kundera also intended to write a novel of polyphonic expressions in 
order to invoke the proleptic dimension of art—to show that the past 
already looms in the future, which then reaches its tentacles back into 
the present. 
earlier critics of the novel were understandably more attuned to the 
“tumultuous present of myth-destruction” (dolezel, p. 125) represented 
in The Joke than adumbrations of the moral conundrums that persist in 
an era of globalization.3 However, if some texts are capable of warning 
us against a (bad) future before it happens, it is valuable to have modes 
of interpretation that illuminate this function. the great contribution 
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of the russian Formalists and the Prague structuralists was to insist on 
the internal, autonomous coherence of artistic works, rather than derive 
their meaning from external social, political, or psychological contexts. 
Paradoxically, the anti-Marxist thrust of the structuralist argument 
automatically politicized the whole business of literature and literary 
criticism in soviet bloc countries. as an astute insider writing from the 
outside, émigré critic Peter steiner was able to mine this paradox and 
reconnect aesthetic and social context in interesting ways.4 For instance, 
steiner discovers in Havel’s absurdist plays of the 1960s a “communicat-
ing about a communicative disorder” (steiner, p. 11) and then shows 
how Havel’s ostensibly far-from-political scripts allowed a generation of 
Czechoslovak viewers to apprehend (and possibly rebel against) their 
own participation in a system of pervasive double-speak (steiner, pp. 
218–40). 
steiner’s approach inspires me to see the critic of soviet-era literary 
dynamics in a triple-bind: a) he is only interested in texts that purposely 
foreground aesthetic considerations over ideological ones; and in the 
same vein b) he flouts official “Marxist” injunctions to treat the text 
as a reflection of social relations, and insists on analyzing the internal, 
autonomous organization of a given text; leading to c) an ostensibly 
apolitical approach reveals to him the “secret” of a given text’s explo-
sive political impact in this particular society. Following steiner’s lead, 
i want to incorporate cognitive and evolutionary data into re-readings 
of east european novels, because for all its contested “trendiness,” this 
data actually reaffirms the productive and insightful approach to literary 
systems and culture pioneered by the Prague structuralists. Furthermore, 
a mode of interpretation that helps illuminate the underlying cognitive 
structures of myth-making strikes me as particularly useful in the post-Cold 
War context. it is not enough to explain to my students that behind the 
iron Curtain, people succumbed to this-and-that ideological myth and 
later regretted it. this ends up being a way of out-sourcing guilt to the 
past, without taking into account our role in the future. 
Kundera attributes to his favorite composer an intention to strip away 
“metrical clichés” and “romantic flourishes” in order to lay bare “the hid-
den dimension of people, of words, of situations” (CC, p. 377). in 1965, 
Kundera was already writing against the metrical clichés and romantic 
flourishes that embodied the emotional appeal of Communism. i will 
cite just one passage out of dozens to show how the Party’s invocations 
of harmony, homeland, and heroism are systematically re-contextualized 
and dismantled under Kundera’s scrutiny. For instance, here the lyrical 
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appeal of children licking strawberry soft-serve cones is re-inscribed as 
a parody of the uplifting symbol (torch) of revolutionary fervor:
again i passed people carrying little red-capped cones, and again i thought 
that the cones looked like torches, and that there might be some mean-
ing in their shape, because those torches were not torches, but parodies 
of torches, and the pink trace of pleasure they so solemnly displayed was 
not pleasure but a parody of pleasure, which would seem to capture the 
inescapably parodic nature of all torches and pleasures in this dusty little 
town. (p. 166)
But it was not enough to demolish socialist realist facades; Kundera 
needed to find a way to lay bare the “hidden dimension of people, 
words, situations.” this aesthetic task required an existential analysis, 
i.e., an examination of what makes people tick that is broad enough 
to implicate all of humanity, but deep enough to reflect the peculiar 
influence of a given historical moment. in what follows, i will argue that 
two current theories about how our minds ascribe intentional psycho-
logical states to other people (so-called theory of Mind) as well as to 
non-personal events that happen to us (a proposed existential theory 
of Mind) provide a rich interpretive framework for understanding the 
social and historical context of Kundera’s innovative aesthetics. 
II
First of all, in The Joke and other early works (e.g., the short story 
collection Laughable Loves), readers are confronted with an unfamiliar 
blend of erotic subject matter and cerebral analyses of how the would-be 
lovers assess each other’s unspoken intentions. We do not get to watch 
Ludvik’s expert seduction of the married Helena in order to make 
our own inferences about how he reads her and she reads him (as we 
might “watch and infer” the thoughts of turgenev’s characters). instead, 
Ludvik’s theory of how to predict and manipulate Helena’s desires is 
made clinically explicit: “the management of a woman’s mind has its 
own inexorable rules . . . it is much wiser to grasp her basic self image 
(her basic principles, ideals, convictions) and contrive to establish (with 
the aid of sophistry, illogical demagoguery, and the like) a harmonious 
relationship between that self-image and the desired conduct on her 
part” ( Joke, p. 181). one of the most striking things about Ludvik’s nar-
ration is the way he relentlessly exposes the cognitive steps by which 
one character infers the motivations of another.5 
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Cognitive psychologists have a model of human inferential capacities 
in regard to the behavior of other people, known as the theory of Mind 
(toM).6 in a nutshell, our “theory” of how other people’s minds work 
is a constant, automatic, everyday facet of our mental functioning. We 
regularly attribute unobservable intentions to other people’s observed 
behaviors. therefore, if i observe you as you cross your legs and roll 
your eyes while reading this, i attribute a state of mind to your behavior. 
i might ascribe to your behavior a mental state such as boredom, or 
creeping incredulity that this topic is being pursued in this journal, and 
so forth. it is easy to see how the ability to read intentionality (some 
kind of mental stance) in the observed behavior of those around us 
would be a highly adaptive trait, one that was vigorously selected for in 
the course of human evolution. our ancestors thrived when they were 
able to discern in a glance or a movement the likelihood of a neighbor’s 
cooperation, courage, or intent to deceive.
When we read novels, we habitually transfer our almost nonstop 
penchant for mindreading to the task of figuring out social relation-
ships in a fictional world. to answer the question of why we read fiction, 
Lisa Zunshine argued that at least two highly adaptive features of our 
mental architecture—our “theory of Mind” and our meta-representa-
tional abilities—are given a good workout when they enter a fictional 
playground full of social intrigue (e.g., the nineteenth-century comedy 
of manners), complex characters (e.g., revealing themselves in stream-
of-consciousness), or multi-layered attributions of guilt (e.g., detective 
fiction).7 to put it very succinctly, the mind on fiction busies itself 
with deciphering the plausible emotions and intentions signaled by 
a character’s behavior, and when necessary, it eagerly delves into the 
meta-representational task of deciphering nested layers of intentionality: 
anna lowers her black lashes and narrows her eyes [behavior] because 
Vronsky’s inappropriate adoration makes her feel both guilty and tri-
umphant [inferred mental state 1], but she wants to deny that she feels 
either guilt or triumph [inferred mental state 2], and she knows [first 
layer of representation] that Kitty knows [second layer of representation] 
that her denial is false. i insert this example to show that invoking the 
relevance of toM to our reading of fictional texts highlights both the 
complexity and the surprising naturalness of our ability to translate a 
simple “anna’s lowered gaze” into an ominous knot of passionate and 
duplicitous feelings. 
now we can see that Kundera intends to “make strange” the very 
naturalness of our toM, by diverting our expectations for a mindread-
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ing romp through the complicated, erotically charged social milieu he 
depicts. We are diverted towards an awareness that powerful social and 
political ideologies intersect with “normal” toM functioning in ways that 
are probably historically and culturally specific. as many interpreters 
of the soviet period have pointed out, the actual implementation of 
socialism as cultural practice involved a multi-layered system of coded 
signs and behaviors on the part of both rulers and the ruled. Yurchak 
characterizes the transition from stalinist to post-stalinist culture as a 
process of disconnecting (and realigning) what was actually said (the 
“constative” function of authoritative discourse) from what was actu-
ally meant (the increasingly negotiable “performative” function of this 
discourse).8 in this ambiguously controlled but potentially repressive 
environment, the relationship between “observed actions” (she raised 
her hand at a Party meeting to vote ‘yes’) and “unobservable intentions” 
(this was not a signal that she believes in communism, but a signal that 
she knows that we know that she doesn’t, but we will pretend that she 
knows that we know she is willing to play the game as the system requires, 
etc.) was a matter of great political and personal import, so that a kind 
of “folk expertise” on the dynamics of mind reading was implicit in the 
local culture. in The Joke, Kundera’s sharp portrayal of how characters 
read (or misread) each other’s behavior should be read as a sustained 
comment on the social pathology engendered by the Czech response 
to soviet occupation. 
Put another way, Kundera is not always interested in affording us 
the pleasure of “mindreading” his characters. instead of sketching the 
contours of their behaviors and allowing us to infer their probable states 
of mind, he makes a parody of the whole connection between observed 
actions and unobserved states of mind. For instance, when his narrator 
Ludvig stumbles into a secular Christening ceremony at the local town 
hall, he details the muscular efforts that produce a woman’s smile, so 
that one new mother “stared up at the ceiling, then her eyes fell and 
met the glance of someone in the audience; the glance so ruffled her 
that she tore her eyes away and smiled, but the smile (the effort of the 
smile) quickly vanished, leaving only a rigid configuration of the lips” 
( Joke, p. 169). this mode of description, complete with an italicized 
parenthetical analysis of the non-smile’s unwilling origins, completely 
co-opts the reader’s own ability to infer mental states from the micro 
shifts in a character’s expression. in fact, Kundera’s narrator has offered 
us the kind of description a well-programmed robot might produce. 
it scans and records a sequence of small gestures and attributes some 
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correct mental states to what it sees (ruffled, rigid). it completes the 
activity of “mindreading” for us, in a way that is both discomforting 
and unexpected in a novel that skirts with more familiar conventions 
(adultery, revenge, small-town social life). the impression made by these 
parodic passages is that the author has chosen to depict mainstream 
small town life in his society as somehow autistic. 
the theory of autism forwarded by Baron-Cohen and most of his 
peers indicates that the problem of autism is fundamentally a “social 
deficit” resulting from the mind’s inability to cope with fluid, complex, 
unpredictable, or ambiguous systems (including almost all social behav-
ior, conversation, fiction, emotional expression, etc.). the autistic mind 
craves sameness, and finds comfort in systems that are lawful and predict-
able.9 What can it mean to say Kundera invokes an “autistic” society? By 
this i do mean that he depicts autistic characters, but that as soon as an 
author chooses (for whatever artistic reason) to sever the connection 
between observed behavior and inferred state of mind (“normal” mind-
reading at work), the resulting representation of human interactions 
mimics the problem of autism. Czech society under Communist rule is 
thus construed as a system that abhors ambiguity and unpredictability. 
Vaclav Havel diagnosed the same symptoms in his famous 1978 essay 
“the Power of the Powerless.”10 in his telling, the predictable complicity 
of Czech citizens in the regime’s bankrupt public rituals can be attrib-
uted to the following calculations: “i, the greengrocer XY, live here 
and i know what i must do. i behave in the manner expected of me. i 
can be depended upon and am beyond reproach. i am obedient and 
therefore i have the right to be left in peace” (Havel, p. 7). obviously, 
this risk-avoiding attitude has nothing to do with clinical autism (nor is 
it specific to socialist societies!). on the contrary, steiner characterizes 
it as “schizophrenic” because the greengrocer pretends to be obedient 
in public, whereas we all know that in private he can be scathing about 
the hypocritical shortcomings of the regime.11 
drawing on gregory Bateson’s theory of the “double-bind,” steiner 
diagnoses a problem people encounter when forced to respond to 
utterances whose objective-linguistic meaning is the opposite of their 
meta-linguistic meaning (steiner, p. 10). example: Let’s say children are 
told to sing every day “Lenin’s Party is the people’s strength / leading 
us to the triumph of Communism” (lyrics of the soviet national anthem, 
revised and adopted in 1977) by a Party whose members enjoy enormous 
material benefits not available to 90% of the “people.” the singers will 
eventually adopt a behavior that does and says and pretends to believe 
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one thing in public, while venting other beliefs at home. My reading of 
Kundera suggests that at least some russian and east european writers 
have portrayed the “double-bind” behavior as something more nuanced 
(if you will) than schizophrenia. the public pretending-to-pretend-to-
believe behavior mimics the mental stance of Baron-Cohen’s autists, in so 
far as the public self participates in official discourse as if that discourse 
were indeed a rigidly predictable and unambiguous system of signs. the 
private self reverses its mental stance and interprets (or over-interprets) 
every gesture as potentially fraught with complex intentionality. thus, 
Baron-Cohen’s recent description of autism as an extreme point on the 
range of cognitive preference for systematizing versus improvising may 
also turn out to be a useful intellectual and discursive framework for 
thinking about how modern societies effect individual behavior. People 
are perfectly capable of pretending to be socially tone-deaf systematizers 
in public, while operating as fully sensitive mindreaders in private. 
The Joke’s depiction of Czech society in the aftermath of stalinism 
reveals that nobody can trust anybody; personal behavior has become 
unmoored from internal belief systems, outward appearances have been 
systematically co-opted from and alienated from natural expressions 
of a subjective inner world. this interpretation is most dramatically 
confirmed in the moment of Ludvik’s conviction by the court of his 
peers, which he re-plays over and over again in his mind. Pre-trial, he 
thought he could intuit a myriad of thoughts, emotions, and reactions 
behind the outward behavior of his various friends and colleagues. 
the moment of his conviction marks a turning point, after which he 
expects ideological considerations to trump the “normal” inferences 
generated by our instinctive mindreading. the fact that he censors the 
more generous promptings of his astute toM is figured as the cause of 
his pointed alienation and bitterness long after he successfully returns to 
civilian society. Fifteen years after his arrest, he still finds that “whenever 
i make new acquaintances, men or women with the potential of becom-
ing friends or lovers, i project them back into that time, that hall, and 
ask myself whether they would have raised their hands; no one has ever 
passed the test: every one of them has raised his hand in the same way 
my former friends and colleagues (willingly or not, out of conviction 
or fear) raised theirs” ( Joke, p. 76).
Here’s the odd thing about Ludvik: our embittered, cynical ladies’ 
man has learned to censor or “correct” his toM impressions of other 
people, but he can’t seem to get rid of an irrepressible urge to ascribe 
intentional psychological states to impersonal events, against all rational 
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logic. this skeptical and disillusioned Czech intellectual suspects that 
even those of us with existentialist leanings cannot help but discern 
codes of meaning conveyed in the gestures of the universe:
For all my skepticism, some trace of irrational superstition did survive in 
me, the strange conviction, for example, that everything in life that hap-
pens to me also has a sense, that it means something, that life speaks to us 
about itself through its story, that it gradually reveals a secret, that it takes 
the form of a rebus whose message must be deciphered, that the stories 
we live comprise the mythology of our lives and in that mythology lies the 
key to truth and mystery. is it an illusion? Possibly, even probably, but i 
can’t rid myself of the need continually to decipher my own life. (p. 164)
the fact that Kundera’s characters can discern the fine print of fate 
(“whose message must be deciphered . . .”) even in the spiritually dev-
astated landscape of their lives is so remarkable that the psychological 
mechanism of attributing meaning and intentionality to the random events 
of our lives becomes one of the novel’s primary thematic and structural 
motifs. 
III
as a group, readers of journals like this one tend to define themselves 
as secular, critical thinkers. We claim to interpret the events that make 
up our biographical experience without resorting to “hidden patterns” 
revealed by folk beliefs, religious platitudes, or superstitious assumptions 
about reality that cannot be plausibly investigated by scientific method. 
We are smart skeptics who do not normally ascribe any intentionality 
to the small coincidences of daily life; e.g., if a parking space opens up 
just when i need it, i rationally believe that this occurrence (which saves 
me a lot of time) is a random fluke of probability, not a coded message 
from some disembodied Parking spirit that i was meant to show up for 
my meeting early. note, however: if my prompt arrival coincides with a 
sudden opportunity to take someone else’s spot in a life-transforming 
project, i will find it hard not to ascribe benevolence or clairvoyance 
to the force that gave me that parking space. in this sense, i am as 
superstitious as Ludvik. as we have seen in the discussion of toM, this 
mode of thinking is not contested when we are dealing with agentical 
subjects who might plausibly desire or intend a certain outcome. What 
daniel dennett has described as “adopting the intentional stance” (as 
opposed to seeking physical or design causality) allows us to explain 
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the behavior of a system in terms of its likely intentional states (belief, 
desires, hopes, fears, etc.), so it is obviously well suited to dealing with 
most people and animals.12 But what are we to make of the urge to 
ascribe intentionality to the universe?
one direction of current research postulates that somewhere along 
the path to our modern selves, the inferential capacities implicated 
so usefully in our mind reading capacity (toM) extended to other 
spheres of cognitive functioning.13 is it possible that once we became 
expert readers of other people’s behavior, we also become expert and 
unstoppable readers of the behavior of the universe? in his article on 
“the existential theory of Mind,” cognitive evolutionist Jesse Bering 
reiterates that even when we believe that meaning is only generated 
within the mind itself, it is hard to find a person who in practice does 
not project some meaning-making agency onto an external, specified 
(e.g., god) or vaguely disembodied psychological agent of some sort 
(Bering, p. 5). the etoM hypothesized by cognitive psychologists may 
or may not constitute a dedicated domain of the brain (not important 
for our purposes), and it may or may not be particularly adaptive, if it 
evolved as a spandrel of another, profoundly adaptive piece of mental 
architecture. nevertheless, so much of The Joke experiments with our 
perception of etoM’s ubiquitous yet puzzling resilience. at both the 
structural and stylistic levels, this novel plays with the tension between 
our rational denial of fateful design and our almost irrepressible urge 
to project intentionality onto the events that befall us. 
Kundera’s representation of trauma, and the anxious space that hov-
ers between forgetfulness and vengeance, is grounded in the careful, 
hyper-alert dissection of the mind’s irrational insistence on establishing 
a story of existential purposefulness. Both Kundera and Bering empha-
size the ineluctability of our drive to discern and decipher existential 
meaning (even when we suspect rationally that there is none). But Ber-
ing’s etoM model is value-free: in his account, the human brain has an 
adaptive, evolved mind reading capacity (toM) that has expanded from 
a system of inferring meaning from behavior into a system of inferring 
meaning in autobiographical events. the etoM model does not predict 
anything further about the variety of disembodied psychological agents 
held responsible for events (gods, superstitions, ideological premises), 
nor can it assess the impact of etoM attributions on the regulation of 
human affairs.
Kundera’s novel transcends the explanatory capacity of the universal, 
evolutionary paradigm precisely where it engages the problem of moral 
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value and individual responsibility: is it really all the same to whom or 
to what imagined force we attribute the patterns of meaning we discern 
in our lives? does the fabric of society come apart—or mend itself—
differently if people believe that god, rather than the dialectical Laws 
of History, is responsible for scripting the events that befall them? The 
Joke insists on asking these questions in a way that denies us a happy 
ending. Just at the moment when Ludvik finally lets go of his bitterness 
to reconnect with the native Moravian folk music of his youth (warning: 
constructions of “native” are always a myth!), his friend Jaroslav is felled 
by a heart attack. Kundera ends his novel with a blaze of ambulance 
lights that forebodes the continuing spiritual (and perhaps physical) 
paralysis of the main characters.
the parts of The Joke narrated in Jaroslav’s voice show that he has clung 
to a myth that is rapidly corroding in the oxygenated atmosphere of skep-
ticism and rebellion of 1960s Czechoslovakia. Jaroslav has constructed 
his acquiescence with socialism and his personal existential narrative 
on the basis of ancient folk beliefs. soviet ideology officially celebrated 
all manner of local folk customs as a way of bolstering the supposed 
affinity between Communism and the prelapsarian, communal rites of 
common people everywhere. Peter steiner has explicated the structure 
of Jaroslav’s utopian conservatism, which seeks to justify everything in 
the present as an extension of the past. Jaroslav derives the meaning 
of his existence not from god (or Historical Materialism), but from a 
bond with the spirit of his people—as it is expressed specifically in the 
traditions of Moravian music and folklore (steiner, p. 200). Jaroslav 
justifies his continuing support for the patently artificial, corrupted 
socialist folk kitsch his younger son despises in the following terms: “i 
believe things have a meaning, Vladimir. i believe the fates of men are 
bonded one to the other by the cement of wisdom. i see a sign in the 
fact that it was you they chose to be king [of an annual reenactment 
procession] this year” ( Joke, p. 133). 
Helena’s narrative voice reveals a different story. Helena fell in love 
with the Party in the same moment that she first fell in love with a 
man—for her, the attachment to socialism is purely emotional, con-
nected to her sexual liberation as an 18-year old (in 1949) and subse-
quent marriage to the dashing Party activist she danced with that day. 
Yet even when her husband betrays her and the rest of society has long 
ceased to believe in the Party’s hollow (but repressive and authoritative) 
rhetoric, Helena clings to the grand narrative of Communism because 
it prevents her life from breaking in half. “i don’t want to split my life 
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down the middle, i want it to be one from beginning to end” ( Joke, 
p. 15). When she meets Ludvik in the mid-nineteen sixties, she readily 
attributes his feigned interest in her as a sign that they were destined 
to be together, because Ludvik represents in her mind an unbroken 
thread to the values of her past. 
Ludvik’s old friend Kostka is a Christian. For him, the workings of 
universe are decipherable as coded signs from god, and if one attends 
to the meaning of His messages, life makes sense. in the first part 
of his life, it was easy enough for Kostka to elide the contradictions 
between his Christian faith and his support for the socialist movement. 
Communist doctrine spoke of radical equality and the end of injustice 
in ways that echoed strongly with the message of the gospels, even 
if the identity of the external guiding agent was not longer god, but 
Historical Materialism. By the time Kostka meets Ludvik again fifteen 
years later, cracks have appeared in his faith, but he still holds onto it 
with the tenacity of an articulate interpreter of our etoM: “if we hear 
the voice of Christ’s appeal, we must follow it unconditionally. this is 
clear from the gospel, but in modern times it sounds like a fairy tale. 
What does an appeal mean in our prosaic lives? and yet the voice of 
the appeal can reach us even in today’s world if our hearing is keen” 
(p. 212). thus, when Kostka is persecuted for his religious beliefs and 
pushed out of his prestigious university lectureship by the new socialist 
ideologists in the 1950s, he accepts his demotion to advisor on an out-
of-the-way state farm as “a coded appeal.” in this way, he hypocritically 
translates the reality of defeat and avoidance into a message from the 
external agent who invests his life with meaning. 
The Joke’s fifth protagonist, Lucie, remains mute throughout the 
novel, and critics have remained mute about Lucie.14 it turns out that 
the “ordinary girl” who so fiercely resisted Ludvik’s advances was not a 
nineteen year old virgin. rather, she had been the victim of frequent 
gang rape by a pack of boys from the age of sixteen until she was sent 
off to a reformatory at the age of seventeen. What Ludvik had loved 
about Lucie when he was a conscript was the fact that she seemed so far 
from the political ideologies that had twisted his fate: “she knew noth-
ing of history, she lived beneath it; it held no attraction for her, it was 
alien to her; she knew nothing of great and contemporary concerns; she 
lived for small and eternal concerns” (p. 72). that Lucie’s young life had 
already been broken by a different kind of trauma is of course outside 
of Ludvik’s imagination. the difference between Lucie’s trauma and 
that of the others is not that hers is “personal” and theirs is “political,” 
214 Philosophy and Literature
rather, it has to do with Lucie’s inability to represent or articulate any 
kind of possible intentionality in her fate. 
as we have seen, the novelty of Bering’s theory is that it inverts the 
notion that Man is made in the image of God. on the contrary, if we have 
an evolved etoM, then god (and other divinities, whatever one may call 
them) is simply the name we give to the way our brain functions when 
we employ our etoM. in this sense, which lacks any anthropocentric 
hubris, what we call god is more nearly an image of what evolved as an 
innate human function. Bering doubts our ability to willfully overcome 
the cognitive drive to read intentionality into the universe. “individu-
als may well be ideological atheists, and i do not doubt their sincerity 
on the matter, however, much as solipsists cannot switch off theory of 
mind mechanisms, neither can etoM be totally disengaged” (Bering, 
p. 19). in other words, the skeptics and existentialists may be right, but 
our adaptive brain architecture will not easily allow their philosophy to 
inhabit its cognitive system. We might describe this as a gap between the 
way the brain works and the way the mind works. this particular gap 
is particularly evident when we have to do with instances of historical 
and personal trauma. our etoM kicks into gear, supplying a religious 
(god wills it), or nondescript agent (historical necessity, fate, secret pat-
tern of the universe) as the author responsible for this arrangement of 
events. But what happens in response to severe trauma, defined as an 
event which defies representation, which cannot be put into words, or 
even re-imagined? annie rogers has defined the essence of trauma as a 
complete failure of representation—it can’t be named.15 in this case, our 
etoM comes up against a countervailing cognitive arsenal of responses 
to trauma: shutting down, denial, deflection, refusal of memory, inability 
to fathom the intentionality of the world so construed. this is what has 
happened to Lucie: she is the one character in the novel whose normal, 
cognitive capacity has shut down; her existential theory of mind has been 
shattered. she exists only as a mute foil to the other narrators’ orgies of 
meaning-making throughout the novel. in particular, her helplessness 
as a rape victim contrasts with Ludvik’s determination to get revenge 
on his former political enemies.
We will indulge in another evolutionary theory to shed light on the 
meaning of Ludvik’s utterly unsuccessful revenge. in an essay for the 
New Yorker, Jared diamond suggests that basic human instinct urges us 
towards personal vengeance.16 While diamond is quick to endorse mod-
ern judicial procedures instead, he uses the story of his new guinean 
informant to show us that the thirst for vengeance is a basic human 
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emotion, whose satisfaction we deny and circumvent to the detriment 
of our individual psyches. diamond’s essay belongs to the wider genre 
of popular evolutionary psychology. its purpose is to show us how our 
evolved brains really work, in order to better understand how we might 
soothe our souls. He believes that if we acknowledge the thirst for ven-
geance as a biological given, we will perhaps find ways to make amends 
for the personal suffering entailed when one’s loss is not avenged. 
Ludvik’s story of personal vengeance complicates the evolutionary 
view of human nature presented by diamond, because it engages our 
etoM as a competing, perhaps equally powerful evolutionary drive. 
When the opportunity arises, Ludvik sadistically seduces Helena, in 
order to get back at her husband Zemanek, the man who orchestrated 
the kangaroo court that arrested him many years ago. in a scene that 
seems to function as the antipode to Jared diamond’s story in the New 
Yorker, Ludvik discovers all the reasons that personal vengeance turns 
out to be deeply unsatisfying. Far from hurting Helena’s philandering 
husband, he actually does him a favor. Moreover, after treating the naïve 
Helena badly, he feels depressed and sullied by his own participation 
in the violence he meant to avenge. Worst of all, since time has moved 
forward, his old nemesis is no longer the same person. “i recognized 
the Zemanek i had known; but [his] content staggered me; it was evident 
that he had completely abandoned his former views, and if he and i 
were now to frequent the same circles, in any conflict i would, like it 
or not, find myself taking his side” (p. 271).
Faced with the futility of vengeance, Kundera’s protagonist finally 
concludes that the past can only be forgotten;
Yes, suddenly i saw it clearly: most people deceive themselves with a pair 
of faiths: they believe in eternal memory (of people, things, deeds, nations) 
and in redressibility (of deeds, mistakes, sins, wrongs). Both are false faiths. 
in reality the opposite is true: everything will be forgotten and nothing 
will be redressed. the task of obtaining redress (by vengeance or by for-
giveness) will be taken over by forgetting. no one will redress the wrongs 
that have been done, but all wrongs will be forgotten. (p. 294)
this is a strong statement, coming from a narrator whose meta-literary 
commentary about his own meaning-making processes has struck us as 
unusually astute for most of the novel. suddenly he determines that any 
act of vengeance is always already too late (the processes of forgetting 
and re-interpreting have already taken hold), and that all we can do is 
resign ourselves to anesthesia of time. 
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this is amoral. if he abandons himself to the “vertigo” of forgetfulness, 
he is not just letting go of old grudges, he is also letting go of his barely 
acknowledged guilt and complicity in the Communist Party’s robust ini-
tial spree in the halls of academia (where Ludvik was an activist-student). 
thus, the novel’s ethical compass does not come to rest on Ludvik, or 
on any of the other characters. rather, it rests on The Joke’s unusual and 
in some ways prescient aesthetic discovery: a curious, clinical appraisal 
(whether scientific or aesthetic) of our uniquely human drive to infer 
existential meaning is the one thing that can best contribute to our 
understanding of trauma and the possibility of adequate reparation. 
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